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Abstract 
The 2010 earthquake in Haiti has exposed the extreme vulnerability of a people living in a 
country where the state and the economy simultaneously fail to deliver. Haiti’s neighbor, the 
Dominican Republic, has witnessed several phases of strong economic growth since the 1870s 
and an encouraging transition towards democratic rule in the late 20th century. How could this 
Caribbean island drift apart so profoundly? Capitalizing on decades of seminal scholarship in 
the neo-institutional tradition North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) have developed a new 
conceptual framework to explain different performance characteristics of societies through 
time. In this study we put the latest vintage of institutional theory to the test by taking it to the 
case of Hispaniola. We conclude that it captures the differing internal logic of the political 
economy in both countries quite well, but that it is of little use to understand the effect of 
external (international) relations on long term development.   
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1. Introduction 
In the late Tuesday afternoon of January 12th 2010 a devastating earthquake near Haiti’s 
capital Port-Au-Prince took an estimated 250 thousand lives and shattered the future 
perspectives of many more Haitians.1 In the aftermath of this catastrophe international media 
registered a shocking incapacity of the Haitian government to improve the lot of its crestfallen 
population. Emergency aid provided by the international community, including medical and 
logistic assistance from the neighboring Dominican Republic, was frustrated by ailing 
organizational discipline. People who lost their homes still struggle to survive in improvised 
tent camps two years afterwards and the Cholera epidemic that broke out shortly after the 
quake is still a serious concern for public health. Haiti is a classic example of a failed state 
and compares to countries like Somalia and the DRC. With a GDP per capita of $1,300 Haiti 
belongs, together with Afghanistan, to the poorest countries in the world outside sub-Saharan 
Africa (CIA 2011). And to make matters even worse, Haiti is also one of the world’s most 
unequal countries, with a Gini-coefficient of household income inequality of 0.59 (Frankema 
2009, 52).  
 
Figure1: A 17th Century map of Hispaniola 
 
Note: Haiti currently covers ca. one-third of the Western part of the island; the Dominican Republic the Eastern 
two-thirds. The present border is approximately indicated by the black line (added by the authors). 
Source: unknown, map from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hispaniola (accessed 11/08/2011).  
                                               
1 Official estimates of the death toll range from 200.000 to 250.000. For the sake of comparison, the 1989 
earthquake in the San Francisco Bay Area (7.1 at the scale of Richter against 7.0 in Haiti; a similar densely 
populated area) had an official death toll of 63.    
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 In the late 18th century the French colony Saint Domingue -Haiti since 1804- was one 
of the wealthiest countries in the world, although it should be emphasized that the majority of 
its enslaved population did not benefit from this status (Eltis 1997). Spanish Santo Domingo -
Dominican Republic since 1844- was a backwater in the vast Spanish American empire (see 
figure 1). Santo Domingo was no match for Haitian forces when they overran the Eastern side 
of the island territory to re-unite the island in the early 19th century. Yet, the Dominican 
Republic (DR henceforth) recorded one of the highest growth rates in the Western hemisphere 
during the 20th century. With a current per capita GDP of $8,300 the World Bank classifies 
the DR as an ‘upper middle income country’. Today, the welfare gap with Haiti can be 
observed in almost every aspect of daily life. How could this island drift apart so profoundly? 
And what lessons can be drawn from this peculiar case for integrative theories trying to 
explain different trajectories of social, political, economic and institutional development?  
 This article offers an attempt to take this particular case to the latest vintage of neo-
institutional theory as developed by North, Wallis and Weingast in their 2009 book Violence 
and Social Orders. Apart from the fact that the development history of Hispaniola is largely 
understudied, there are at least two good reasons why this case is particularly interesting from 
a theoretical point of view. Firstly, we are dealing with an evident example of a long term 
‘reversal of fortune’. This offers a typical problem to theories designed to explain long-term 
processes of economic divergence: they have to be sufficiently flexible to allow for major 
turning points in history, while sufficiently rigorous to explain path dependence thereafter.  
 Secondly, as both countries share one island, geographical explanations for the 
divergence can largely be ruled out. Hispaniola’s ecology supports the profitable cultivation 
of tropical cash crops such as sugar, bananas, coffee, tobacco, cotton, indigo and sisal in both 
parts of the island. Earthquakes and hurricanes are as common in the western as in the eastern 
part of the island.  Some scholars do not want to dismiss the role of geography, however. 
Jared Diamond argues that ecological degradation in Haiti has reached Malthusian 
proportions, partly because Haiti disposes of a smaller area suitable for intensive agriculture 
compared to the DR. Haiti’s mountain slopes consist of thinner soils with a lower recovery 
capacity and the island’s rains are mainly coming from the east and the major rivers are 
flowing eastward, supporting higher rates of plant growth in the Dominican Republic 
(Diamond 2005, 339).  
 However, overpopulation became an issue after the reversal, not before. Haiti’s 
population increased from circa. 0.4 million people in 1804, to 1.5 million in 1900, to 3.1 
million in 1950 and 8.9 million just before the earthquake (Mitchell 2007; Pons 2010). 
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Moreover, the development of large-scale plantations initiated deforestation on the Dominican 
side, too, but in the DR a sense of eco-political awareness led to early municipal regulations 
prohibiting logging and contamination of streams. Bottom-up lobbying for environmental 
protection led to the purchase of a first natural reserve in 1927, which was unique in the 
developing world at that time (Diamond 2005, 342). Hence, even Diamond (2005, 333) 
admits that ecological differences are a result, rather than a cause, of the political and 
economic divergence of these neighbour countries.  
 The most cited institutional explanation for persistent poverty in former Latin 
American colonies focuses on the post-colonial persistence of deep seated socio-economic 
and political inequality rooted in growth-impeding colonial institutions. The main idea is that 
the colonial heritage of inequality has disabled societies to make optimal use of their 
productive resources, and especially their human resources (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; 
Engerman and Sokoloff 2005). Mahoney (2010) has recently offered a more ‘historicized’ 
view, incorporating, amongst others, the effects of major colonial institutional reforms (e.g. 
the 18th century Bourbon reforms in Spanish America), but he also underwrites the idea that 
colonial legacies have predetermined current social and economic outcomes. 
 There is no doubt that the French and the Spanish bequeathed Hispaniola with a highly 
unequal distribution of income, assets (land, capital) and political influence. Moreover, the 
extremely repressive system of sugar slavery that was practiced by the French in Saint-
Domingue arguably made the legacy of colonial inequality more pronounced in Haiti than in 
the peripheral colony of Santo Domingo (Leyburn 1966; Rotberg and Clague 1971). 
Nevertheless, there are at least two major difficulties with the argument that this legacy has 
had persistent effects until present. 
 Firstly, colonial institutions were discarded far more decisively in Haiti than in the 
DR. The leaders of the slave revolution (1791-1804) granted full civil rights to the former 
slave population, pushing the notion of egalité of the French Revolution far beyond the 
‘unthinkable’ in those days (Fatton Jr. 2007, 67). The large scale redistribution of land after 
the revolution was unmatched in the region (Frankema 2010). Foreign land ownership was 
prohibited and sugar plantations, or any other form plantation agriculture for that matter, 
never revived. Indeed, Haiti’s transformation from a prototype plantation economy into a 
post-slavery subsistence farming economy was unique in a region where sugar slavery 
continued to constitute the socio-economic paradigm. In other words, it is difficult to see the 
current Haitian state as the product of a persistent colonial system of inequality, which does 
not imply of course that one system of inequality cannot be replaced by another.     
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A second problem is that political disorder was endemic in both countries for most of 
the past two centuries. Series of violent coups alternated with periods of ruthless dictatorial 
rule. There is absolutely no reason to presume that the nature of political instability and 
disorder was graver in Haiti than in the DR before the last quarter of the 20th century. Table 1 
shows that the average time in office of a Dominican president was actually notably shorter 
and the proportion of illegitimate regime changes considerably larger. In fact, it is only of 
fairly recent date that the DR has embarked on a path of political and peaceful 
democratization, with regular, free and fair elections. We will argue in this study that the 
different development paths of the DR and Haiti are rooted in different political decisions 
made by equally predatory political elites. 
 
Table 1: Post-independence regime changes in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1804-
2010 
  Period of independence 
Change of 
presidency  
Average years in 
office 
Presidents completing 
at least one term 
    no.   no. % of total 
Haiti (1804-2010) 59 3,49 17 29% 
Dominican Rep. (1844-2010) 83 1,88 16 19% 
Source: Authors own calculations based on Haitian data from Bob Corbett, Webster University: 
www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/misctopic/leftover/headstate.htm Corbett based himself primarily on Lyonel 
Paquin (1983) The Haitians: Class and Color in Politics, New York: Multi-Type. The DR data are from Moya 
Pons, Frank (1997) Manual de Historia Dominicana, Santiago, D.R. UCMM, 587-598. 
 
 These different policy choices can be best understood by adopting the concept of 
‘social orders’ as recently developed by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009; NWW 
henceforth). Capitalizing on decades of seminal scholarship in the neo-institutional tradition, 
these authors offer an all-embracing conceptual framework to explain the long-term processes 
of political and socio-economic divergence in relation to the varying solutions societies have 
devised to the fundamental human problem of violence. The second part of our argument is 
political elites implement policies and reform institutions in the context of their international 
relations. These international relations often constrain the choice-set of elite coalitions in 
varying ways. This external factor is crucial to understand Hispaniola´s divergence, as we will 
argue, but remains largely outside NWW’s framework.  
 We will proceed by introducing the key elements of NWW’s ideas in section 2, 
followed by a brief historical introduction of the island’s separation in two different states in 
section 3. Section 4 discusses the timing and nature of the reversal of fortune and section 5 
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offers an explanation of the reversal. In section 6 and 7 we apply NWW’s framework to 
deeper causes of the different social and economic policies implemented in both countries. 
Section 8 concludes.     
 
2. Violence and social orders 
The key premise of NWW’s Violence and Social Orders is that people engage in social 
organizations because of a shared preference to contain violence. The different ways in which 
societies deal with the problem of violence are crucial to understand the different political 
logics underpinning socio-economic policies. Societies mediate political, economic, religious 
and military power through formal and informal institutions. These institutions structure 
human relationships by giving citizens control over resources and social functions and, by 
doing so, shape the incentives of individuals and groups who have access to violence. The 
pattern of social organization that emerges from these institutions is what NWW call a ‘social 
order’ (2009, xi). NWW distinguish two basic types of social order.    
In an ‘open access order’ (OAO henceforth) violence is controlled by an extensive 
web of public and private organizations guaranteeing free entry to political and economic 
markets to all members of society, regardless of their social background, ethnic origin, or 
political preference. A government monopoly on the use of violence (i.e. civilian control over 
police forces and the military) is secured by legal, administrative and judicial powers that 
carefully balance potentially conflicting interests of the state and the society. OAOs support 
human relationships and economic transactions by formal institutions (law) and by 
encouraging citizens to participate in public life. OAOs invest huge sums of money in 
education, health care, arts and infrastructure to strengthen civil society. OAOs are a 
relatively new phenomenon in human history. Only a handful of Western societies fulfill the 
conditions of simultaneous open access in the economic and political domain. Once 
established, however, OAOs tend to be stable, because people internalize its constituting 
values, such as freedom of speech and congregation, in their belief systems. People are 
willing to defend these values by articulating their beliefs in social exchanges, cultural 
expressions and, of course, via the ballot.  
In a ‘limited access order’ (LAO henceforth) violence is contained in a fundamentally 
different manner: by simultaneously constraining economic and political access. LAOs are 
stable because people with access to means of violence that pose a credible threat to the 
political status quo, also have an interest to live in peace and will, therefore, abstain from 
using force if they can benefit from access restrictions. Hence, the most important condition 
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for political stability in an LAO is economic monopoly power. Politically controlled entry 
barriers to economic markets generate the rents needed to reward elite members for the 
continuation of their political support (or abstinence from violence). Political access, in turn, 
has to be restricted in order to secure the extraction and distribution of rents among the elite 
minority. Social mobility is mediated through the vertical and personal networks of patronage, 
rather than by open competition. The stability of the ‘dominant coalition’ of elite factions thus 
depends on its ability to organize its own cohesion. 
OAOs are better capable of sustaining economic growth than LAOs because an OAO 
secures contract enforcement mechanisms that allow economic agents to engage in 
impersonal exchange (trading without knowing each other). Impersonal exchange is a 
necessary (though by no means sufficient) condition for sustained economic growth because it 
pushes market integration, labour division and specialization beyond the limitations of 
personal trust-based networks. Ruling elites in LAOs that commit themselves to growth-
promoting institutions face a trade-off: liberating access to economic markets may enhance 
productivity and broaden the tax base (which can in turn be used to strengthen political 
power), but it also supports social mobility outside the channels of political patronage. Social 
mobility of ‘outsiders’ poses a threat to political stability when it differentiates elite interests, 
enlarges the middle class and raises the call for political inclusion and economic reform by 
larger and more varied groups of citizens.  
In NWW’s framework the structure of economic rents underpins the stability of the 
politically dominant elite coalition. When the coalition is unstable, there is a tendency to 
make rents more 'personal'. Strengthening ties of personal loyalty stabilizes the coalition, but 
at the cost of reducing market access, which makes the economy less productive. NWW 
define rent as the ‘return to an economic asset that exceeds the return the asset can receive in 
its best alternative use’ (p. 19). All else being equal, it is much easier to consolidate political 
power in a resource-rich LAO where large revenues can be derived from assets that are easy 
to monopolize. One of the explanations for the endurance of many Middle Eastern dictatorial 
dynasties is that they are underpinned by oil monopolies. In a resource-poor LAO, where 
rents can only be obtained by directly extracting income surpluses from a large part of the 
population, elite collations are more difficult to maintain.  
OAOs also produce rents, but in a fundamentally different way. In an OAO rents are 
created by market competition that supports a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. 
Free market access guarantees that the rents derived from innovations are appropriated by the 
technicians, scholars, entrepreneurs and investors who invented, applied, adopted and 
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invested in these new technologies. Their entitlement to rents remains independent of their 
personal political connections and places their incentive structures in line with the economic 
objectives of society at large: it generates the technological progress needed to sustain 
productivity growth.   
According to NWW the LAO has been the ‘natural state’ (2009, 31) throughout 
recorded human history. The authors identify three types of natural states: the ‘fragile’, the 
‘basic’ and the ‘mature’ natural state. The main distinction is the degree to which the state 
credibly commits itself to the development and maintenance of public and private 
organizations supported by formal institutions. NWW consider Haiti as a prototype of a 
‘fragile natural state’; a state that ‘can barely sustain itself in the face of internal or external 
violence’ (2009, 42). In fragile states elite coalitions are volatile and short-lived. Fragile 
natural states cannot sustain economic growth in ways mature natural states can, because they 
lack that degree of organizational freedom required for the development of impersonal social 
and economic transactions. For impersonal exchange people have to put their faith in secure 
contract enforcement mechanisms which reduce the costs of transactions below prohibitive 
levels. Impersonal exchange, in turn, is a necessary (though by no means sufficient) condition 
for sustained economic growth because it allows for increasing market size, labour division 
and specialization beyond the limitation of personal trust-based networks.   
 States are ‘fragile’ if the dominant coalition is easily upset by external shocks such as 
natural disasters, relative price changes or military strategic changes of neighbor states. The 
capacity of any elite faction to remain in charge depends largely on the personality and 
judgment capacities of its leaders. These leaders often risk death when they make mistakes. 
Fragile states can achieve some stability when the ruling elites manage to protect the 
economic privileges of the major political shareholders. Binding and maintaining the interests 
of the army is critical in this process. In fragile states the institutional structures are simple 
and not conducive to economic development because ‘members of the coalition cannot 
credibly commit themselves to rules or constitutions when the month-to-month reality of the 
balance within the coalition is in flux’ (2009, 42). Elite factions fighting for control have a 
short-term political horizon, which complicates the long run investment policies needed to 
achieve sustained growth. Public education investments offers a notable example in the Latin 
American context (Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000; Frankema 
2009; Wegenast 2009; Lindert 2010). In the short run government support for public 
education implies a redistribution of public resources from insiders to outsiders. In the long 
run it enhances the share of educated people capable of defining their interests and organizing 
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opposition. Free and open access to various levels of public education is, therefore, a defining 
feature of a mature natural state. 
 The present-day DR fits NWWs typology of a ‘mature natural state’. The country has 
reached a degree of political stability that secures a macro-economic environment conducive 
to foreign and domestic investment. Economic and political organizations are supported and 
secured by a set of formal institutions that constrain the use of arbitrary power and reduce 
transaction costs in the economy. A stable system of property rights protection allows 
entrepreneurs to develop business or trade organizations independent from personal political 
connections. Successive DR governments have committed themselves to economic 
diversification via the removal of entry barriers to capital markets and the improvement of the 
public education system. DR governments have also subjected themselves to strict laws 
regulating environmental protection (despite the potential rents that can be obtained from 
disobeying these laws). Moreover, since 1978 all DR governments have come to power 
through free and fair elections, which has been unprecedented in DR history.  
 The key questions that now remain are why political elites decide differently with 
regard to the reciprocal access to economic and political markets? And why does a stable 
order develop in some societies, whereas other societies regularly regress into disorder? In 
NWW’s conceptual framework the structure of the rents that underpins the powerbase of the 
elite forms the key to an answer. In the case of Hispaniola, as we will try to show, the 
structure of the rents indeed mattered a lot, but this structure of rents was critically co-
determined by the international context in which both states were operating. This insight 
subsumes our case-study, as smaller polities always depend to some degree on international 
alliances to secure their political independence and economic interests. And these alliances 
constrain the policy-alternatives of political elites to a non-negligible degree.  
 
3. The division of Hispaniola 
Although the colonization of Hispaniola became the starting point for the conquest of a vast 
American empire, the island itself soon lost its appeal to Spanish settlers.2 The available 
sources of gold were rapidly depleted and European germs, violence and mass suicides 
brought the indigenous Taíno population at the verge of extinction in just three decades after 
1492. In the second half of the 16th century earthquakes and hurricanes destroyed a series of 
harvests and a smallpox epidemic killed the majority of imported African slaves. Meanwhile, 
                                               
2 After his first Atlantic voyage during the autumn of 1492 Columbus established a settlement (la Navidad) at 
the north-eastern shores of present-day Haiti. He named the island La Española: ‘Little Spain’ (Elliott 2006). 
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the better situated port of Havana (Cuba) emerged as the major Caribbean stepping stone for 
Spanish Trans-Atlantic traffic (Pons 2010). During the mid-17th century French buccaneers 
started to roam the island’s unprotected northern and western coastlines.3 The depopulated 
Spanish settler communities in the eastern part of the island were unable to drive them out and 
military support from Spain was insufficient. Endemic warfare in the Caribbean made it too 
costly for Spain to reconnect Santo Domingo to its main Atlantic navigation routes. In 1665 
Louis XIV claimed the western part of Hispaniola as French territory. Spain officially ceded 
the territory to France in the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. The formal recognition of ‘Saint-
Domingue’, as the French called their new colony, paved the way for European investments 
in a colonial slave plantation complex that turned the area into the world’s wealthiest sugar 
producer by the late 18th century. At the eve of the French Revolution the slave population 
was estimated at 450-700 thousand souls, controlled by ca. 31 thousand Europeans and 28 
thousand free mulattos (Heinl and Heinl 1978, 25; Plant 1987, 7; Fatton Jr. 2007, 18). Sugar 
output levels outstripped the production of the entire British West Indies (Plant 1987, 7). 
Saint-Domingue accounted for more than a third of France’s foreign trade and became the 
second trading partner of the US after Britain (Brown 2005, 30; Fatton Jr. 2007, 132). Santo 
Domingo, that was to remain backwater in the Spanish empire, benefited from its neighbor 
economy by specializing in the export of livestock products such as meat, tallow and hides to 
the French plantations.   
 The balance of power in Saint Domingue was upset in the 1790s. Moved by the ideas 
and the spirit of the French Revolution the free mulatto population started to demand equal 
political rights. The ensuing political conflict turned violent and spiraled out of control when 
both parties decided to enlist slaves in their armies with the promise of manumission after 
service. This unleashed one of the most successful slave revolts in human history. The slave 
revolt put a definitive end to French rule on Hispaniola. After the decisive defeat of 
Napoleon’s troops, the Republic of Haiti declared independence at January 1st 1804; the 
second independent country in the American hemisphere after the US.4  
To rule out the possibility of a French restoration, all white plantation owners were 
killed or expelled and most of the sugar plantations were effectively dismantled. The new 
Haitian constitution drafted by the legendary slave leader Toussaint de l’Ouverture, prohibited 
slavery and foreign landownership in order to legally prevent a restoration of the sugar 
slavery practice. The new political leaders understood that agrarian exports had to be the 
                                               
3 The term buccaneer refers to pirates based in the Caribbean (Rogozinski 1999, 85-94). 
4 “Haiti”, meaning “mountainous land”, was the Arawak name for the island of Hispaniola. 
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economic mainstay for the new republic, but opinions differed on how to reform the economy 
after the demise of the sugar estates. Between 1807 and 1820, Haiti was de facto split up over 
this issue in two opposing states; the northern kingdom reestablished the sugar plantation 
system based on mandatory wage labor services. The southern republic redistributed land to 
independent smallholders and soldiers serving in its army (Brown 2005).  More than a decade 
of war had reduced Haiti’s population around 1804 by perhaps as much as a quarter of the 
pre-1791 total and the dissolution of the French owned sugar plantations had put vast tracts of 
cultivable land in the hands of the state. However, the newly independent state lacked the 
policing power to enforce the new peasant class to work on plantations in harvest times and 
squatting became the new norm. Upon re-unification by President Jean-Pierre Boyer in 1820, 
the laws of the southern republic were extended to the whole of Haiti, which eventually 
resulted in the primacy of a rural subsistence economy, with a modest smallholder’s coffee 
export sector.  
The development and collapse of the sugar slave system fully adheres to the logic of 
an LAO. The dominant coalition made up by French sugar planters was stable for more than a 
century because the elites had coherent political interests in the maintenance of a profitable 
and extremely exploitative economic system. Because of their small numbers the French and 
mulatto elites were aware that internal cohesion was fundamental for survival. It is also clear 
that this economic system was unsustainable in the long run, because it lacked the conditions 
required to diversify and to open up market access to larger parts of the population. The 
failure to extend political access eventually also caused its collapse. The subsequent 
transformation from a capital-intensive plantation economy into a rural subsistence economy 
structured accessible rents in such a way that it was far more complicated for incumbent 
political elites to extract sufficient rents to organize long term elite cohesion. Dominant 
coalitions were frequently undermined by political guerillas that gathered support among a 
large impoverished peasant majority that found itself excluded from urban-centered patron-
client networks.         
 The Haitian revolution could not leave Santo Domingo unaffected. Haitian forces 
overran the eastern part of the island in 1801 and again in 1804.5 The fear that the French 
would use Santo Domingo as a base for the re-conquest of Haiti -as Napoleonic troops had 
done in 1802-03- turned its subjugation into a security imperative. Santo Domingo, which was 
politically and demographically dominated by creoles and mulattos, reverted to Spanish rule 
                                               
5 In fact, in the Treaty of Basel of 1795 Spain had granted the entire island to France. The Haitian government 
claimed to be the rightful heir to this treaty (Bellegarde-Smith 1990: 52-53; Stinchcombe 1995: 201-207). 
11 
 
in 1814 after expelling the Haitians with the help of European naval support. Pons estimates 
that the DR population was halved by 1809 in comparison to the 1789 level as a result of 
endemic warfare and the prolonged economic crisis. Colonial entrepreneurs, landowners, 
intellectuals and clergymen were either dead, or had left the island (Pons 2010, 116). Haitian 
forces under command of President Boyer again seized the country in 1822 and established an 
“iron rule” that lasted until 1844 (Schoenhals 1990, xviii). Slavery was again abolished and 
land was seized from the church and large landowners on a large scale. The economy fell into 
a new prolonged period of disarray. These 24 years of Haitian occupation of Santo Domingo 
germinated long-lasting tensions that remained interwoven in the interactions of both societies 
until the present day.6 
 However, the Haitian revolution affected international relations in the entire Atlantic 
world. Especially Cuban and American slave owners watched the slave revolt in their 
‘backyard’ with great suspicion (Saint-Louis 2010). According to Stinchcombe Haiti became 
“a racial symbol of powerful and rich blacks, black rulers, black generals winning wars’’ 
(1995: 247). The US government refused to recognize Haiti as a sovereign state until the 
1860s. France and other Caribbean slave states contained ‘Negro power’ with trade embargos 
and international diplomatic isolation. Haiti’s international excommunication greatly reduced 
its opportunities to revitalize its agrarian export sector (Lundahl 1989; Geggus 2001; Fatton 
Jr. 2007), while the revolution pushed the political orientation of post-independent DR 
governments in an opposite direction. Securing foreign military support from Spain, Britain, 
France and the US was a primary concern for successive DR governments until their military 
had become so strong under Trujillo in the 1930s that the balance of military power was 
decisively tilted the other way.7  
 The changing international relations in the wake of the Haitian revolution are 
important to understand why Haitian society failed to overcome endemic political instability 
in the course of the past two centuries and, also, to understand why DR elites, who essentially 
operated in equally chaotic circumstances, with equally predatory and coercive solutions, 
eventually committed themselves to policies supporting economic modernization. These 
policies generated a set of institutions that created sufficient scope for secure land ownership, 
environmental protection, foreign investment and a steady expansion of key public services 
                                               
6 The fact that Dominican doctors were one of the first to provide medical care after the earthquake has been 
widely regarded as a hopeful sign of change in the complicated relationship between both countries.    
7 Spanish troops were even invited to take possession of the island in 1861, but were expelled once again after a 
bloody civil war in 1865. In the 20th century the Dominican Republic created one of the strongest armies of Latin 
America and much of the popular support for the army is clearly based on the tensed relationship with Haiti.  
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such as education, health care and infrastructure. None of this emerged in Haiti at any 
comparable scale or time horizon. As in North and South Korea, where the communist and 
capitalist development models are reinforced by mutual political resentment, the persistent 
differences in the economic development models of Haiti and the DR were nurtured by the 
social, political and cultural cleavages that had grown so deep during the Haitian occupation. 
 
4. The reversal of fortune, 1870-1930 
The DR established a sustained economic lead over Haiti during the six decades between 
1870-1930, an era in which export-led growth improved living standards in large parts of 
Latin America (Thorp 1998; Bulmer-Thomas 2003). Increasing exports of agricultural 
commodities and mineral resources were driven by an increasing demand from the 
industrializing countries in the North, a dramatic decline of ocean freight transport costs and 
the increasing availability of foreign capital and technological knowledge (O'Rourke and 
Williamson 1999; Taylor 2006). As the US emerged as the world supreme economic leader in 
the late 19th century, US investors were eager to find profitable outlets of financial capital 
inside and outside their country. The DR managed to bandwagon the ‘Golden Age’ of 
Atlantic economic integration by developing a competitive sugar industry.  
 The expansion of the DR sugar industry was to a considerable extent financed by US 
capital and guided by the know-how of Cuban sugar planters who fled the civil war (1868-
1878) in their own country (Baud 1987). Cuban sugar entrepreneurs were familiar with the 
newest technologies in cane cultivation and sugar milling and disposed of the necessary 
capital to set up their businesses elsewhere on the basis of wage-labour (the Cuban war 
concluded with the formal abolition of slavery). Between 1875 and 1882 no less than 35 
steam mills were built and sugar constituted more than half of the annual export value of the 
DR between the late 19th and mid-20th century.   
 Haiti failed to embark on a path of export-led growth. Coffee was the major export 
commodity, but the Haitian smallholders did not have access to sufficient land and capital to 
expand and professionalize their businesses. Figure 2 presents the sugar and coffee export 
volume indices for 1880-2000 with the base year 1900 (= 100). The graph shows that sugar 
exports in the DR increased at an exponential rate between 1880 and 1930. Sugar exports rose 
from 4.5 thousand metric tons in 1880, to 54 in 1900, 93 in 1910 and 323 thousand in 1929. 
Haiti exported 30 thousand metric tons of coffee around 1900, but despite intermittent 
fluctuations this quantity was almost similar in 1929 and even a bit lower on average during 
the early post-war years (Mitchell 2007). In 1910 the per capita US$ value of DR exports was 
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twice as high as Haiti’s.8 In 1929 the gap had grown to a factor 3, in 1950 to a factor 4 and in 
the early 1970s to a factor 8 (Mitchell 2007). 
 The commercial expansion of the DR spurred the development of domestic transport 
and communication networks (Pons 2010, 491). Foreign investors from Cuba, Europe and the 
US built up their stakes in the sugar industry and supplied the capital for investments in 
railways, port facilities and communication systems (Plant 1987, 14-16). Railway 
construction picked up during the 1880s and resulted in a track of ca. 180 km in 1900, 
connecting the major cane growing areas to the coastal ports of Santo Domingo and San 
Pedro de Macorís. With a reported length of 37 kilometers in 1900 railway construction in 
Haiti had hardly taken off (Mitchell 2007). By the late 1920s the per capita number of cars 
and telephones in use was approximately three times as high in the DR (Mitchell 2007, Tables 
F6, F9). 
 The record of primary school expansion points to a more encompassing commitment 
of successive DR governments to socio-economic modernization. Table 2 shows the 
development of gross primary school enrolment rates per decade between 1920 and 2000. The 
share of children in school in the DR was double that of Haiti by 1930 and even three times as 
high one decade later. By 1960 the DR had reached virtually complete primary school 
enrolment rates, while in Haiti about half of the children had no access to education and this 
remained the case throughout the 20th century.9  
 The average primary school enrolment rates of 15 Latin American countries (table 2, 
4th column) indicates that mass education was spreading faster in the DR than in most other 
Latin American countries. By 1930 the DR lagged behind with ca. 15%, but by 1960 it had 
surpassed the regional average by 11%. A similar rapid increase occurred in secondary 
education after World War II. Between 1950 and 1960 the enrolment rates increased from 12 
to 22% in the DR, against a rise from 3 to 5% in Haiti. Illiteracy figures illustrate the 
enormous impact of the divergence in educational development: in 1950 ca. 87% of the 
                                               
8 The IMF economists Jaramillo and Sancak (2007) argue that the economic and institutional differences 
between Haiti and the DR were insignificant until the 1930s and claim that the DR established a decisive lead in 
per capita income only in the early 1960s. They rely on a comparison of dubious GDP per capita series starting 
in 1960 from the World Development Indicators. Surveying income and land distribution statistics Lundahl has 
demonstrated that Haitian census estimates are “among the worst in Latin America” because of guesswork, 
deliberate government manipulation and a complete lack of accurate rural income data (1996, 110) Jaramillo and 
Sancak concede that the absence of data prior to the 1960s hampers their analysis, but completely ignore the 
existence of alternative data and even fail to mention the take-off of the sugar industry in the DR in their 
historical survey (2007, 24).  
9 The current situation in Haiti is so dramatic that the publication of official figures on primary school enrolment 
has been stopped altogether. 
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Haitian youth aged 15-24 was illiterate, while in the DR this rate had been reduced to 47% 
and continued to decline rapidly afterwards (UNESCO 1965). 
 
Figure 2: Index series of the volume of sugar exports of the Dominican Republic and 
coffee exports of Haiti, 1880-1960 (1900 = 100; y-axis logarithmic scale) 
 
Source: Mitchell 2007, Tables C16 and C18 
 
Table 2: Gross primary school enrolment rates, 1920-2000 
  Dominican Republic  Haiti  Average of 15 LAC's* 
1920 na 18 47 
1930 41 22 56 
1940 63 20 63 
1950 75 34 75 
1960 99 38 88 
1970 107 49 98 
1980 118 67 102 
1990 97 56 103 
2000 118 na 113 
Source: Frankema 2009a, Appendix Table A.4.1., pp. 222-223. See also Frankema 2009b. 
Notes: Observations of year closest to stated year. The average enrolment rates for 15 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries is unweighted and includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay.  
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Historical accounts of the labour situation in the DR reveal that part of the fruits of 
growth trickled down to the lower income classes. In 1884 the first strike of Dominican cane 
cutters for higher wages was recorded (Plant 1987, xii). In the following decades more and 
more Dominicans refused to work in the cane fields because alternative jobs in agriculture 
were more profitable and there was abundant land available to start new farms. Immigrant 
labour had to be recruited from Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Canary Islands, in order to 
accommodate the labour shortages during the harvest season. During the US occupation of the 
DR (1916-1924) an increasing part of the labour reserve was supplied by landless Haitian 
peasants (Plant 1987). Dominican workers could afford to avoid the miserable labour 
conditions in the cane fields. For Haitian labour migrants economic necessity outweighed the 
deep emotional objections against the return to ancestral conditions of labour confinement. 
 A comparison of real wage levels in 1950 provides an impression of the degree of 
inequality that had emerged over the past half century. An unskilled male adult day labourer 
in Port-Au-Prince would earn circa 1,350 Haitian Gourdes a year, which is the equivalent of 
270 US$ at the official 1950 exchange rate. Unskilled adult male workers in Ciudad Trujillo 
(Santo Domingo) would earn approximately 440 US$. The nominal wage difference of 63% 
cannot be explained by differences in price levels. Calculating the price differential of a basic 
consumer basket containing rice, maize and wheat flour, meat, sugar, oil and soap we find that 
only 18% of the nominal wage differential can be explained by higher consumer prices in the 
DR, which leaves a gap in real wage income of 45%.10  
 Of course, this is a very crude estimate of wage inequality, but probably an 
underestimate. When we take the compositional differences of the labour force into account it 
is highly likely that average real income gaps were higher than 45%. In 1970 more than three-
quarters of the Haitian labour force was still employed in agriculture. Average subsistence 
farmer’s incomes were under pressure of land degradation and population growth (Lundahl 
1979, 81). Stagnating agricultural exports coincided with a steady decline in the average size 
of landholdings due to maintenance of the Code Napoléon, stipulating that all children have 
equal property inheritance rights (Lundahl 1979, 278). The 1971 agrarian census reported an 
average holding size of 1.4 hectare, while 86% of Haiti’s farmland was part of a holding 
under 5 carreaux (6.5 hectares). These minifundias were used for a mixture of food (corn, 
sorghum, rice) and cash crop cultivation (coffee). The ratio of cultivated land to labour had 
                                               
10 These real wage calculations are based on wage and price data derived from the Institut Haitien de Statistique, 
Bulletin Trimestriel de Statistique, No. 1, 1951, Port-au-Prince; and Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario 
Estadistico de la Republica Dominicana 1950, Ciudad Trujillo   
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become the lowest (0.6 hectares) in all of Latin America (Lundahl 1979, 76). By comparison, 
in the DR the share of the agricultural labour force shrunk from 72% in 1950 to 47% in 1970 
to just below 20% at the close of the 20th century (ILO 1997).  
 The structural change of the DR economy created opportunities for fiscal reforms that 
proved impossible to realize in Haiti. In the second half of the 19th century government 
budgets in both countries relied for more than four-fifths on custom revenues. The DR 
managed to diversify its fiscal basis and increase the share of internal taxes (property, income, 
consumption) and non-tax revenues so that the share of custom duties in total government 
revenue declined from ca. 80% before 1914 to ca. 25-30% by the end of the 1930s. These 
fiscal reforms widened the scope for long term public investment programs and, even more 
fundamentally, underlined the gradual development of a social contract between state and 
society: even Trujillo, one of the most cruel dictators of 20th century Latin America, 
understood that when a state levies direct taxes it has to offer something return. Haitian 
governments remained heavily dependent on volatile custom duties and foreign aid during the 
entire 20th century.  
 
5. Why did the Dominicans seize the opportunity? 
Why were the Dominicans, contrary to the Haitians, able to realize export-led growth? 
Ecological differences can certainly not explain the migration decision of Cuban planters in 
the 1870s-1880s. After all Haiti had been the world’s leading sugar producer for a long time 
and still was an ideal tropical location for cane cultivation. However, the Haitian constitution 
prohibited foreign land ownership. This law reflected the deep resentment against the former 
colonial plantation system. Various 19th century Haitian governments have tried to recover the 
plantation economy, not in the least place to increase the state revenue basis. But their 
attempts to introduce the so-called codes rural, stipulating the labour obligations of peasants 
on large commercial farms, were jeopardized by popular resistance. Haitians refused to 
comply with legislation forcing them to become wage workers on cash crop plantations. 
Many former slaves choose to set up a farm in the mountain areas (Marroonage), where they 
could live outside state control, avoiding army recruiters and tax collectors (Lundahl 1979).11  
Black peasant resistance against mulatto attempts to revitalize the plantation economy 
was, more than once, used by shrewd political entrepreneurs to overthrow the incumbent 
government. Peasants organized as guerillas (the cacos) attacked the propertied classes. Such 
                                               
11 The general disposition to legal disobedience still hampers rural development, as many peasants never cared to 
register their land entitlement. This complicates the formation of size-efficient farms (Rogozinski 1999).  
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agrarian revolts often unleashed a new wave of military repression and centralization of 
power under newly installed leaders (Fatton Jr. 2007: 106). Potential mulatto investors lost 
interest in a rural living and started to lease out their lands to smallholders on the basis of a 
share-cropping agreement. Hence, by the end of the 19th century almost all of the cultivable 
land was cultivated by smallholders, the majority of which engaged in subsistence farming. 
The inability of large landowners to secure their economic interests via the political channel 
was quite exceptional in the Latin American context (Lundahl 1979; Frankema 2009) and is 
of great importance in view of the NWW thesis. Political stability was recurrently undermined 
by waves of violent guerilla attacks and military counter-attacks. However, an environment 
where the majority of black peasant farmers was so openly hostile against latifundistas 
(particularly when former slave-owners!) was not very attractive to Cuban planters 
considering emigration.  
The fact that Haiti prohibited foreign investments in its agricultural sector does not 
explain why Cuban planters choose to settle in the DR. In fact, investment prospects in the 
DR were far from optimal either. In the 14 years between the end of Spanish rule (1865) and 
the victory of the liberals (1879), the DR witnessed no less than 21 regime changes and 
endemic guerilla warfare between liberal political forces from the North and conservative 
forces in the South. However, as a former Spanish colony the DR had something to offer to 
Cuban sugar lords who, after all, spoke and thought in Spanish. Cuban planters shared their 
cultural identity with the creole and mulatto elites in the DR. There was no open hostility 
against plantation owners and large plots of state owned lands could be bought or leased at a 
reasonable price.  
 Still, the liberal hold of power in the 1880s was crucial in pushing the incipient sugar 
industry beyond its formative stage. The liberal government decided to open up new lands for 
sugar plantations and grant concession to foreigners for the construction of new sugar mills. 
Tax exemptions were granted to the producers of vital agricultural and industrial commodities 
such as sugar, salt, coffee, soap, bricks and candles. The liberal elite factions were rooted in 
the tobacco-growing economy of the Cibao region. Tobacco was mainly cultivated on small 
to medium size family farms. The principle export-connections were controlled by German 
merchants (i.e. political outsiders) who organized the shipment and insurance of DR tobacco 
to the major ports of Bremen and Hamburg. Because of the decentralized structure of the 
tobacco trade and the year-round employment it provided, mercantile classes had little 
chances to monopolize part of the trade and extract rents by raising price margins (Baud 1987: 
137).  
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 This particular social and economic structure gave rise to a number of democratic 
procedures for the selection of tobacco industry representatives, who resisted taxes on income 
or land, but agreed on the use of custom duties for the military struggle against the South, for 
investments in infrastructure such as roads and port facilities, and for the development of 
credit institutions facilitating agrarian loans and public education (Hoetink 1982). In the South 
the rural system was dominated by large landowners, who relied on debt peonage to grow 
food crops, raise cattle and produce timber. They resisted the development of an independent 
peasantry, but the development of the sugar trade transformed the socio-economic 
relationships in the South. Impoverished peasants were eager to sell their land and start 
working as wage workers in the cane fields, in the sugar mills or in complementary service 
activities (Bryan 1978). 
In sum, Haitian and DR elites were both aware of the policies required to realize an 
export-led growth model in the closing decades of the 19th century. In both countries such 
policy considerations were subject to violent confrontations. In the DR these confrontations 
were designed along regional lines, in Haiti they took the form of a class struggle between 
urban (mulatto) elites and the free black peasantry. However, the combination of Haiti´s 
domestic institutions (the constitution) and its adverse international reputation worked 
strongly against the expansion of its domestic export sector through foreign investments. DR 
elites, on the other hand, were forced to look for international partners in order to secure its 
political independence. Political opposition against foreign economic interference (investors, 
land ownership etc.) existed, but was not strong enough to undermine the institutions that 
secured foreign economic interests. The liberal era created a critical juncture in the 
development of DR’s social order, because it invited foreign investors and domestic 
entrepreneurs, who had little political influence beforehand, to become a major economic and 
political actor in the 20th century.  
 
6. How foreign interventions affected the structure of rents 
In the previous section we discussed how the legacy of the economic transformation after the 
slave revolution affected the internal political dynamics and, in turn, the choices of 
governments to support or restrict foreign business initiative. Here we pursue our argument 
that the gradual opening of access to economic markets was more likely to sustain in the long 
run in the DR than in Haiti, despite the fact that this was certainly not a linear process, nor one 
with a pre-determined outcome.    
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The growing access to foreign capital during the late 19th century created a problem in 
the DR that is often witnessed in LAOs: as the state is captured by private interests (self-
enrichment, patronage) it can be burdened by unsustainable levels of public debt at the 
expense of society at large. An unsustainable level of foreign debt forced the DR government 
in the early 1900s to sell off its main public revenue source (the custom houses) to the Santo 
Domingo Improvement Company (SDIC): a euphemism for an American private and profit-
based company. The SDIC bought out European creditors and acquired large control over the 
DR state finances. In 1905 the US president Theodore Roosevelt announced the financial 
annexation of the DR because of its inability to repay its debt and set the SDIC on a side 
track. This financial annexation would last for more than 40 years, until Trujillo paid off the 
last portion of foreign debt in 1947 and resumed control over the custom houses (Munro 
1964). This long period of US control over the DR’s custom houses had profound 
implications for the structure of rents that could be captured by the political elites.  
 Between 1916 and 1924 the US further enlarged its grip on the DR through a full-
fledged military occupation. This occupation was a direct response to war time conditions. 
With the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 the island of Hispaniola had gained major 
strategic importance. Enduring political instability in the DR, with no less than 14 regime 
changes since 1899, was considered to be against US interests in a time of grave military and 
economic tensions. Although the military occupation was highly unpopular (not in the least 
place because of its repressive nature), it proved a blessing in disguise for the sustainability of 
DR’s incipient economic development (Calder 1984).  
The occupation re-established a minimum level of political stability needed to secure 
business interests and protect foreign and domestic investments. The military government 
restored financial stability and balanced budgets. The chronic shortage of seasonal labour was 
relieved by a program allowing the temporary migration of Haitian peons to work in the cane 
fields (Plant 1987). Investments in public works were scaled up. With the completion of a 
national network of highways a permanent transport connection between the North and South 
was established, which was a major step forward in the political unification of the DR. 
Moreover, the military government carried out a strict program of civilian disarming, thereby 
reducing the future power of local guerilla movements. The new national army built up under 
US supervision was granted the exclusive monopoly on the use of force (Calder 1984).  The 
years following the occupation were characterized by growing prosperity and political 
freedom. For the first time a new DR government was installed via free and fair elections. 
Horacio Vásquez (1924-1930) guaranteed press freedom and the control of the army by the 
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civil administration. While the world economy recovered from the First World War and DR’s 
export revenues surged, Vásquez continued the investment programs in infrastructure, 
education and health care.  
For the occupation of Haiti the US had almost identical motives: prevent German 
occupation of the island, restore political order and enforce delayed payments to US money 
lenders (Schmidt 1995). The occupation of Haiti was to last much longer, however, from 1915 
to 1934. The Ameericans immediately set out to break the destablizing potential of the cacos 
by training a national army (the Garde d’Haiti) and develop local infrastructure to consolidate 
army control. Yet, the US intervention achieved far less of its goals in Haiti in two decades, 
than in the DR in eight years. There were two major reasons for this difference. First, US 
forces found popular resistance much more difficult to handle than in the DR. Second, the 
available resources to invest in Haiti were much smaller and harder to obtain, since fiscal 
revenues were smaller and less easy to tap. 
Given the lack of domestic investment capital in Haiti the Americans introduced a 
corvée system of forced labour to construct roads, which revived the memories of slavery and 
racial discrimination, especially when some US officers started to abuse the system for other 
purposes. An early uprising against the corvée system was put down by US marines, but 
guerrilla warfare continued unabated (Bellegarde-Smith 1990: 82). The corvée system was 
abolished in 1918 because it generated too much hostility. Agrarian reforms, including the 
introduction of new agrarian technologies and the reorganization of the public education 
system, also stayed put, because public funds had to be channelled towards Haiti’s debt 
redemption.  
In order to pave the way for foreign investors the Americans drafted a new 
constitution in 1918 removing the clause that prohibited foreign landownership. In addition, a 
1922 law authorized the “leasing of unoccupied lands” for longer periods (Lundahl 1979, 
266). These measures did not generate the expected large-scale investments, however. When 
the US forces withdrew in 1934, only two large American-owned enterprises were 
operational: the HASCO (sugar) and the Dauphin Plantation (sisal) (Pettigrew 1958). The 
American endorsement of large-scale plantations led to opposition among peasants, especially 
after the expulsion of peasants from their lands. The bloody 1929 uprisings worried president 
Hoover so much that he initiated a scheduled withdrawal to save the reputation of the US 
army. The Haitian development program, intended as a long-term venture, was among the 
first elements to be “sacrificed”.  
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The gravest miscalculations on the American side (which bear close resemblances to 
recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan) pertained to the particular socio-ethnic garment of 
Haitian society: the marines brought a “strong racial prejudice” to Haiti, according to which 
all Haitians were black, illiterate peasants and inferior to the white race (Lundahl 1979, 466). 
This attitude violated the distinction that the members of the light-skinned Haitian elite 
themselves made between the black peasants and their own kind and thus incited antagonism 
among the mulattos who had initially welcomed US intervention, since the occupiers needed 
them in government positions. The exhibited racism thwarted the agricultural education 
project which relied on support from the Haitian elite. The Americans disdained the 
traditional Haitian school system with its emphasis on (heroic) literature and classical studies 
according to French model; reform plans suggested by the native Minister of Education were 
ignored. The American belief that the Haitian peasant would benefit more from agricultural 
and vocational education was based on the idea that Haitians did not need intellectual 
instruction and provoked resistance from the Haitian authorities who resented American 
arrogance. Thus, the US occupation failed to induce change in the Haitian education system 
that kept perpetuating the overt class divisions between the governing elites and the illiterate 
peasants. And without a sound education system this malicious social equilibrium kept 
burdening social and economic progress in Haiti throughout the remainder of the 20th century.      
 
7. Two ‘strands’ of dictatorial rule, 1930-1986  
US efforts to export ‘democracy’ to other places in the world have a long history, with 
varying rates of success. Within a few years after the departure of the US marines, dictatorial 
rule was restored in Haiti and the DR. In both countries dictators emerged who managed to 
consolidate power for a long time (Trujillo in the DR, 1930-1961; the Duvalier dynasty, 1950-
1986). However, there were clear differences in the way these dictators organized their 
political support.  
 In just a couple of years after his coup d’état in 1930, Trujillo created a de facto 
monopoly on political power which he retained for more than thirty years until his 
assassination in 1961. His economic policy focused on the expansion of domestic production 
through import substitution. Agricultural self-sufficiency and rapid industrialization were the 
hallmarks of this philosophy. Trujillo’s economic management intertwined economic 
expansion with elite predation. He passed numerous laws granting monopoly rights to 
enterprises or even entire sectors in which he built up his personal stakes. A large number of 
companies were bought up with public money or via dubious fiscal constructions. Trujillo 
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became the national captain of industry, owning all sorts of industries, ranging from cement, 
paper, glass and nails to medicines, liquors, textiles and, of course, sugar. He also controlled 
the financial sector (Crassweller 1966; de Galíndez 1973).  
Trujillo’s self-enrichment went hand in hand with real progress in technology, 
productivity and structural change (Crassweller 1966; de Galíndez 1973). Vast tracts of 
unopened state land were allocated to landless farmers and brought under cultivation. Turits 
(2003) shows how Trujillo negotiated the opposing economic interests of various stakeholders 
in his policies of land redistribution, where he managed to simultaneously satisfy the demands 
of the big sugar companies and the peasantry, as well as safeguarding the interests of the US 
government and his domestic political clientele. The agrarian sector achieved self-sufficiency 
in major staple crops like rice, corn and beans by 1950. Agrarian growth reinforced industrial 
expansion. Between 1938 and 1960 the number of manufacturing establishments almost 
doubled, while industrial sales grew with a factor 12, capital investments with a factor 9, raw 
materials input with a factor 14 and the expenses on fuel and lubricants even with a factor 22 
(Pons 2010, 362-363).  
 The US government tolerated Trujillo’s systematic violations of human rights because 
he was a proclaimed anti-communist and guaranteed stability, until in the 1950s his 
cleptocratic style of government became obsessive. His nationalization programs started to 
choke off economic growth and attempts to expropriate the large American-owned sugar 
businesses in the DR were a clear sign that he had lost sense of political reality.12 The Trujillo 
dictatorship shows, in line with the legacies of dictators like Pinochet (Chile) and Suharto 
(Indonesia), that rapid economic progress is not necessarily bound to concur with widening 
political access. In fact, under Trujillo political access became more restricted than ever. It 
was the stability and, hence, the predictability, of his economic rule which created secure 
conditions for long term investment programs. Trujillo’s monopoly on the use of violence, as 
former chief of the national army, had made it easier to contain political opposition and 
prevent disorder. Trujillo’s major investment programs in education, infrastructure, health 
care and his balancing of agrarian versus urban interests contributed to his grip on power. 
Although his economic policies eventually hampered further economic development, these 
                                               
12 In the final years of his rule Trujillo was confronted by an invasion of Dominican exiles and economic 
sanctions from the OAS (the Organization of American States) in response to his shameless attempt to murder 
Betancourt, the president of Venezuela. As the DR balance of payments worsened and many of his associates 
started to transfer their funds to foreign banks in fear of his downfall, Trujillo had to resort to the IMF for debt 
assistance. He was eventually assassinated by an alleged CIA directed conspiracy in May 1961 (Pons 2010).  
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investments created a basis for subsequent regimes to re-open market access and restore 
economic and political competition.    
 After Trujillo’s death, political exiles returned to the DR supporting the 
democratization movement. Between 1961 and 1978 Neo-Trujilloist politicians (primarily 
Joaguín Balaguer) gave way to the popular call for political democratization, supported by an 
increasing number of depoliticized public and private organizations (Pons 2010). By the 
1970s a politically conscious urban middle class of intellectuals, artists, merchants, 
entrepreneurs, lawyers and doctors had gained sufficient influence to tilt the balance. The 
number of university students had increased from about 300 in 1930 to 4.000 in 1961 and 
45.000 in 1977 (Mitchell 2007: Table I2, 795-796). The diffusion of telephones, radios and 
motor vehicles in an emerging urban consumer society facilitated the spread of news, press 
reports and the organization of mass protests. The attitude of the US had also changed 
considerably. The US now actively promoted the democratization process in the DR.  
 The Duvaliers (1957-1986) did not manage to replicate Trujillo’s dual trajectory of 
expansion and predation. Despite the promises of Francois Duvalier to establish a 
fundamental break with a long history of economic stagnation, political oppression and social 
inequality, the Haitian peasantry was soon deprived of its illusions. Proposed reforms of the 
agrarian sector and the education system lacked a long term investment strategy and 
consistent political commitment. Trade unions were prohibited. The village school system 
which the Americans had tried to reform, reverted to traditional patterns which, as Lundahl 
(1979, 26) argues, constituted “one of the main instruments whereby the governing cliques 
dominate the peasants.” Hence, where entrepreneurs in the DR were able to draw from an 
increasing supply of educated employees as a result of public investments in mass education, 
the Haitian elites stuck to the opposite strategy: avoid public investments supporting the rise 
of a middle class. Hence, the two American companies in Haiti, HASCO (sugar) and the 
Dauphin Plantation (sisal), that established a relatively successful business during the 
occupation years, were only able to survive because they were allowed to function as a state 
within a state. They set up their own villages for their workers, their own schools and sport 
accommodations and also initiated the development of local infrastructure, while struggling 
with an impermeable system of land property rights.13 
                                               
13 Pettigrew (1958) discusses the process of land acquisition at length. The Dauphin Plantation obtained a lease 
contract from the Haitian government for unoccupied state land for thirty years, which no doubt was only 
approved because of US political pressure. However, the government land was interspersed with privately 
cultivated fields. Because it was essential to have vast interconnected tracts of land, private land titles had to be 
transferred to the company. The company eventually managed to obtain all the private land, but the procedures 
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 Another major contrast with Trujillo was the effective dismantling of the US trained 
Garde d’Haiti after Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) assumed power. The American cooptation 
of the mulatto minority during the occupation had reinforced racial tensions in Haitian society 
and Duvalier’s power was to a considerable extent based on playing upon these popular 
sentiments. His candidature was supported by the négritude movement, an urban based mob of 
black Haitians, from which he recruited his personal terror gangs, the infamous Tonton 
Macoutes. By dismantling the national army, Duvalier quickly destroyed the chances at the 
creation of a stable violence monopoly, one of the preconditions for a future of prolonged 
political stability (Ferguson 1988, 38-41). Trujillo did exactly the opposite. He (ab)used the 
American trained army to solidify his position. 
 His initial good relations with the Americans resulted in renewed aid assistance and 
widened access to foreign loans, but the US became increasingly alarmed over Duvalier’s 
open human right violations and his ambivalent attitude regarding communist propaganda. 
After all, Duvalier ruled Haiti during the heydays of the Cold war and the Cuba crises. 
Duvalier was entirely pre-occupied with maintaining his personal position and, from time to 
time, survived attacks on his life and that of his family. He evolved into the prototype of a 
whimsical dictator. In this light, it is no surprise that his government failed to channel part of 
the available aid into cheap rural credit programs for farmers, or to devise fiscal measures in 
support of commercial agriculture. There simply was insufficient stability for a long term 
political horizon and the state’s revenue basis kept eroding: the rising population pressure and 
ecological degradation put increasing strains on the production of subsistence commodities 
(Lundahl 1989). The agrarian crises that was about to unfold, required a type of coordinated 
and collective action for which no institutional structures were in place.  
The constraints to institutional reform were rooted in the immediate post-revolutionary 
years. Former slaves chose to secure economic independence by subsistence farming and 
continued the practice of marroonage, even after the abolition of slavery, showing how 
deeply suspicious the peasantry was of any state initiative. Due to a lack of rent extraction 
possibilities, the system of political patronage was never able to support large groups of 
clients. Hence, political power remained difficult to consolidate and the conditions for 
                                                                                                                                                   
lacked transparency, as Pettigrew recalls: “But finally I signed and a couple of literates who held power of 
attorney from all the rest signed. I handed over several thousand dollars in the presence of the notary […] How 
it was ever distributed is one of those mysteries but it was. After commissions to the surveyor and those acting 
with power of attorney and others I doubt if much over half the sale price ever got to the rightful owners” (123-
4). 
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securing growth-enhancing public and private institutions remained weak. This vicious circle 
proves hard to break. 
Indeed, the differences in style of government between Trujillo and the Duvaliers 
reflect the distinctions in the social order of both countries quite well. Trujillo dealt with the 
problem of violence by strengthening both, the national army (which secured his political 
position) and the public revenue basis (which secured his economic position). Trujillo was 
able to establish a degree of economic security based on tangible government commitments to 
social investments. Duvalier’s terror gangs were cheaper to maintain than a full-fledged 
national army. These gangs operated on a strictly personal basis and were directly tied to the 
central leadership by a cult of fear.  
Jean-Claude Duvalier made no attempts to break with the arbitrary violence and 
structural repression of his father, and probably did less to preserve the economic interests of 
Haiti. He undertook no action to preserve the Haitian sugar and sisal businesses from 
collapsing under pressure of falling world market prices, despite the ironic fact that Haiti 
became a net importer of sugar in the 1980s. He and his wife, Michèle, took pleasure in 
showing off their conspicuous consumption to the poverty stricken masses (Ferguson 1988). 
Baby Doc came to symbolize the immoral predatory state; a state which had lost every bit of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people it was supposed to work for. One author almost exactly 
puts it in the terms of NWWs typology of a fragile natural state: “for the past thirty years, the 
country’s problems have been compounded; the economy is in a permanent state of 
degradation, the political system is marked by the absence of any functioning institutions, the 
already weak sense of the public good is vanishing, class divisions have become obscenely 
inordinate, and poverty has deepened to an alarming degree […] Finally, the absence of 
legitimate central authority has contributed to the parceling of violence and the proliferation 
of armed gangs with ever shifting alliances.” (Fatton Jr. 2007, 7). 
 
8. Conclusion 
In his classic study The Haitian People James Leyburn argued that “If ever a country had an 
opportunity to start absolutely fresh in choosing its own social institutions, Haiti had that 
opportunity in 1804. Free at last, with no traditions to uphold, the first independent Negro 
state in the world, owing allegiance to no man or nation […] All paths were open to them.” 
(1966, 32). We firmly disagree with this statement and NWW’s theory of social orders helps 
to understand why the choice of social institutions is constrained by the internal logic of 
limited access orders.   
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 Right after the end of the slave revolt in 1804 the new Haitian leaders sought to 
consolidate their power by increasing state revenue via the recovery of the plantation 
economy. The majority of ex-slaves wanted to secure their dearly won independence via the 
establishment of subsistence farms on free land. They resisted every attempt at the 
reintroduction of labour discipline. The state lost this battle because it had little opportunities 
to mobilize the resources needed to impose reform laws and to reintroduce coercive policies. 
The mountain areas inhabited by dispersed communities of maroons, proved a perfect 
breeding ground for guerilla groups jeopardizing the establishment of a violence monopoly by 
the state for centuries to come. According to Fatton the skewed relationship between state and 
society, “engendered a generalized indiscipline that incited governments to rule with brutal 
coercion and people to resist by inventing new means of fugitive conduct.” (2007, 67).  
 However, fugitive conduct was not just a deliberate strategy of ex-slaves who wanted 
to escape state coercion. Social and economic isolation was also externally enforced because 
of the international excommunication of the Haitian government far into the 19th century. 
Because the independent republic was not recognized as a sovereign nation state, it was 
impossible to form strategic alliances, to get access to foreign loans and to safeguard trade 
interests. Forced isolation greatly reduced the manoeuverability of successive Haitian 
administrations. When opportunities for export-led growth opened up in the late 19th century 
all the odds were stacked against Haiti.  
 NWW point out that people’s belief systems are determined by their conception of 
historical events. The slave system had created a deep aversion against the plantation sector 
and the successful revolt against it had strengthened the conviction that an escape from 
oppression was possible. The identity of the Haitian society is uniquely shaped by the fact that 
it is the only country in the world where slaves actually liberated themselves. US politicians 
seriously underestimated these sentiments during the occupation (1915-1934) and were 
incapable to overcome popular resistance. The Duvaliers managed to stay in power for about 
thirty years, but only because they maximized repression based on personal ties and survived 
a number of assaults with a considerable dose of luck. 
 Sustained economic growth and structural change in the DR was of course not the 
inevitable result of Haitian underdevelopment. Yet, it certainly helped to raise popular support 
in favor of a distinctively different economic development model. The specific island 
geography created a mirror image, in which Haitian society reflected as ‘anti-modern’, 
‘stagnant’, ‘illiterate’ and ‘irrational’. The DR benefitted from this image in maintain 
important international relations. The Cuban civil war generated an unexpected inflow of 
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foreign capital and technological knowledge; when recurrent political instability threatened to 
undermine the incipient export industry, US strategic interests during the First World War 
helped to restore political order, curb the monetary crises, complete the unification of the 
country and contain guerilla violence by monopolizing military power. By the time Trujillo 
put these achievements at stake in the last years of his dictatorial reign, a substantial group of 
intellectuals, exiles and urban professionals was able to prevent retrogression. Trujillo himself 
had laid an important part of the basis for this middle class political victory. The consolidation 
of the twin process of democratization and economic growth was not pre-determined by 
history, nor is it secured forever, but we are convinced that it was more likely to happen in the 
DR than in Haiti after 1844.     
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